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Abstract
As mandatory employment arbitration has become a more prevalent practice in the
United States over the past decade, numerous studies have examined arbitration outcomes and attempted to explain the factors that produce those outcomes. In particular,
researchers have examined the “repeat player” effect in arbitration. Any defendant
or plaintiff’s counsel who appears repeatedly in the same arbitration forum fares better than “first time” players. Researchers have also studied the internal human resources (“HR”) procedures of employer-defendants facing claims in arbitration and
have come to the conclusion that larger employers likely implement more thorough
and well-structured internal HR procedures which facilitate resolution of disputes before such disputes can reach the stage of arbitration. The focus of these latter studies
have been on the differences in outcomes between employment litigation conducted in
a public court of law and litigation conducted in a private arbitration forum, the impact
of mandatory arbitration agreements (“MAAs”) on employment arbitration outcomes,
and on the repeat player effect, controlling for employer size. Conversely, in this study
I examine explicitly the impact of employer size on employment arbitration outcomes,
controlling for the “repeat player” effect. My findings suggest that employer size matters for employment arbitration outcomes only insofar as the largest employers are concerned, and that furthermore, at least within the confines of the American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”), the repeat player effect has a notable impact only on arbitrations
involving the largest employers - and there principally insofar as plaintiff’s counsel are
concerned.
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This study focuses exclusively on employment arbitration—cases in which an aggrieved
employee files claims for wrongful termination, discrimination, or other such causes, in a
private arbitration forum rather than a public court of law. This study does not consider
consumer arbitration cases, although these are touched upon in the literature review below.1

1. Brief History of Arbitration
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925, American courts
were not obligated to uphold the outcomes of private arbitrations.2 The FAA imparted to
arbitration outcomes the sanctity of any contract, enforceable before court. At the time, this
was an uncontroversial, and even laudable, change. Arbitration could in theory more speedily resolve disputes to the satisfaction of both parties in a given dispute than the court system
could, with recourse to litigation always available for any reason “at law or in equity”. A
year after the passage of the FAA, the American Arbitration Association was founded. The
AAA is now nearly a century old and remains one of the nation’s most reputable arbitration
forums for reasons that will be discussed below.
Arbitration remained a fairly non-controversial part of American legal life until the 1980s,
when the Supreme Court, in a series of rulings, began to elevate arbitration to an equal
footing with litigation. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985), the Court in essence ruled that the choice of forum – public litigation or
private arbitration – was equivalent and ergo immaterial to the outcome of a given case. In
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) the Court ruled that the FAA superceded
conflicting state law, and as such a state could not pass legislation exempting wage disputes from arbitration. These rulings largely put arbitration on the same footing as litigation
1

For a decent overview of many of the reasons why a plaintiff might seek damages or some award in an employment suit, whether in a public court of law or private
arbitration
forum,
see
https://www.fordharrison.com/files/33996_Chapter%2021%20%20Employment%20Litigation%20Causes%20of%20Action%20-%202016-2017%20SourceBook.pdf
2
Throughout this paper I will refer to litigation conducted in a court venue as “litigation”, and litigation
conducted in an arbitration venue as “arbitration”. Both “litigation” and “arbitration” are, strictly speaking,
litigation, but are conducted in entirely different venues, with substantially different rules, and substantially
different outcomes. A practicing litigator may refer to a matter in arbitration as litigation, but he or she has in
mind a largely different set of considerations than if he or she was litigating a case in a public court of law. My
use of “litigation” and “arbitration” is, therefore, shorthand.
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as far as the law of the land was concerned. Following these rulings, arbitration spread
more widely throughout the economy as employers sought to escape state courts (LeRoy
and Feuille (2002)). The AAA and Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (“JAMS”,
founded 1979) were soon joined by a number of new arbitration forums, including ADR
Services, Inc. and others.
In 1995, responding to criticism that arbitration, in contrast to litigation, favored the employer over the employee (notably on the grounds that arbitrators, the counterpart of judges
in litigation, bill by the hour and therefore know what side their bread is buttered on), the
AAA instituted the Due Process Protocol (“DPP”)3 which caps fees, permits broad discovery, and permits employees to have a say in the selection of arbitrators. Because of the
AAA’s implementation of the DPP, the AAA is to this day widely considered one of the
nation’s most reputable arbitration forums.4
DPP notwithstanding, arbitration remained the preferred forum of corporate players, as it
was generally held to be more defendant-friendly, especially after the AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 ruling in 2011. In AT&T the Supreme Court upheld class action
waivers in arbitration agreements. The agreements considered in AT&T were consumer
agreements, not employment agreements, but the precedent for employment agreements had
nonetheless been set. Over the course of the 2010s, MAAs containing class-action waivers
proliferated. It is estimated that today more than 50% of employers of any size bind their
employees with MAAs, most of which contain class-action waivers (Colvin (2019)). In
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 584 U.S., 200 L. Ed. 2d 889 (2018) the
Supreme Court ruled that class-action waivers in employment MAAs do not violate the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). Employees now face a world in which they can
be forced to submit to arbitration as a condition of their employment and they cannot join
with others similarly situated in a class to contest a claim collectively.

3

https://naarb.org/due-process-protocol/
It is worth noting that despite these reforms arbitration remains fundamentally different from litigation:
AAA arbitrators still bill by the hour and AAA arbitrations remain closed to public attendance.
4
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2. Literature Review
Studies of arbitration outcomes have focused predominantly on the differences between litigation and arbitration. This does not come as a surprise. After all, to the layperson, the decisions by the Supreme Court detailed above seem shocking. Determining whether, in fact,
arbitration puts the employee-plaintiff at a disadvantage vis-à-vis litigation is a concern of
paramount importance. This concern, however, is not the focus of this paper, which focuses
exclusively on arbitration outcomes. Estreicher, Heise, and Sherwyn (2017) provides an
excellent run-down of the academic studies of arbitration up to 2018. I will summarize the
findings of these studies (where they agree) here, so as to provide background for the results
to follow:

• Arbitration is generally quicker than litigation; averaging the studies considered by
Estreicher, an individual arbitration generally took 281.25 days to conclude as opposed to 694 days for an individual litigation to conclude.
• Arbitrations are much easier to file than litigations; there are fewer hurdles to overcome. Proponents of arbitration point to this ease of access as one reason why arbitration should be considered a suitable substitute for litigation.
• Employee “win rate” is decided differently by a number of studies, and these studies do not agree whether arbitration or litigation is more favorable to the employeeplaintiff by this metric. That said, it is fairly uncontested within the universe of arbitration studies that the award amount for employment arbitrations is notably lower
than that of employment litigations (in particular see Gough (2020) and Estreicher,
Heise, and Sherwyn (2017)). The rationale for this finding is discussed below.
• Not all arbitration forums are equal. Chandrasekher and Horton (2019) provides a
detailed look at AAA, JAMS, and ADR Services, Inc. and finds different outcomes
for each forum. Studies suggest the the “repeat player” effect may be more prominent
in arbitration forums that do not abide by the DPP.
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This study concerns actions brought by employee-plaintiffs under MAAs (which the AAA
refers to as “Employer Promulgated Disputes”) exclusively, and considers only AAA arbitrations, just as Colvin and Gough (2015) does. Colvin and Gough (2015) defines the repeat
player effect as the occurrence of the same employer-defendant more than once in the entire arbitration forum over the time period considered by the study, and finds a significant
negative impact on both “wins” (the finding of any liability on the part of the employerdefendant, regardless of monetary awards) and the amount of monetary awards for successful employee-plaintiffs. The study finds a separate repeat arbitrator-employer effect to
be even more punitive to the employee-plaintiff.5 Chandrasekher and Horton (2019) finds
these same repeat player effects, but in a twist finds that the repeat player effect for plaintiff’s
counsel6 is also a determining factor, to the benefit of the employee-plaintiff.
The focus of Estlund (2017) is not on “wins”, but rather, on the number of employment arbitration cases that one should expect to find given the corresponding number of employment
litigation cases one finds in the same period. Estlund’s study throws some cold water on the
premise advanced by Estreicher, Heise, and Sherwyn (2017) that repeat players may simply be “larger, more sophisticated employers with multi-step grievance procedures”, more
likely to settle claims before they advance to arbitration, leaving only the weakest or most irreconcilable claims to advance. Estlund concedes that employers “that impose MAAs [may
be] systematically different from those who are not, and less likely to generate claims” but
notes that this premise cannot be quantified. Estlund’s central contention is that MAAs deter the bringing of claims in the first place. Employment arbitrations, even those conducted
within the reputable AAA, are not public, and their secrecy may have a chilling effect on
potential claimants. Further, as is noted in Colvin (2019), many employees are simply not
aware that they’ve entered in a MAA when they are hired.
The survey of HR personnel in Colvin (2019) is hugely instructive regarding the impact
5

To clarify: in addition to the repeat player effect defined by simple appearance in the AAA multiple times,
the repeat arbitrator-employer effect considers when an employer-defendant appears before the same specific
arbitrator, not merely in the same forum.
6
Note: not the identity of plaintiff itself, but specifically the attorney and/or firm bringing claims in arbitration.
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of MAAs on employment arbitration. Colvin found that more than half of all employers
utilized MAAs, and close to 70% of businesses employing 5,000 or more individuals utilized
MAAs. Colvin found that roughly 50% of all employees in 2017 were covered by MAAs
regardless of income level (and those earning less than $13.00 hourly were 65% likely to
be covered by an MAA). Colvin agrees with Estlund that MAAs have a chilling effect on
claims, on the grounds that employment attorneys are less likely to take on representation
of an employee-plaintiff in arbitrations (rather than litigations) due to the lower win rate and
lower awards generally awarded (Colvin (2014)). Colvin’s study may suffer from the defect
of a fairly small number of observations – only 627 respondents provided usable answers
to Colvin’s survey – but there is no denying the detail and illuminating richness of those
observations.
Gough (2020) also examines AAA data, agreeing with Estreicher et al. that larger employers may “filter out” meritorious claims via internal HR processes and thus the cases that
reach arbitration will naturally face harsher outcomes. Like Colvin (2019), Gough conducts
a survey, this time of attorney members of the National Employment Lawyers Association
(“NELA”), to derive his data. Like Colvin, Gough’s observation number is small (277 employment arbitration litigations are considered, along with 556 employment litigations7 ) but
rich in detail. Gough exclusively focuses on employment discrimination cases, unlike the
studies cited above. Gough’s most striking finding is that the demographics of the plaintiff
(gender, salary level and race) have a much smaller impact than the repeat player effect and
the choice of forum—arbitration or litigation. A further study (and another survey), Gough
and Colvin (2020), which specifically considers the background of the arbitrator, again finds
strong repeat player effects: repeat employer-defendants and employer-defendant/arbitrator
pairings produce lower win rates and damages awarded.
On the whole the literature depicts a world in which the MAA is increasingly omnipresent
and inescapable for the employee, in which repeat player effects significantly alter the outcomes of arbitration (typically to the disadvantage of the employee-plaintiff, except where
7

As a reminder, “arbitration” and “arbitrations” in this paper refer to arbitration litigation and “litigation”
and “litigations” refer to court litigations.
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the repeat plaintiff’s counsel is concerned), and in which the larger employer is less likely
to face employment claims in arbitration, possibly due to well-developed internal HR procedures. This study sheds new light on the repeat-player effects.

3. Data
My data is derived from the same sources as Colvin (2019). It is comprised of two parts.
The first part consists of publicly available AAA data (https://adr.org/consumer), current as
of Q2 2020 and limited to “employer promulgated disputes”. My dataset therefore consists
exclusively of disputes arising under MAAs. The second part consists of data from the Dun
& Bradstreet (“D&B”) free data cloud (https://www.dnb.com/perspectives/master-data/dat
a-cloud-400million.html). Insofar as the same employer may be sued under a multiplicity
of names,8 it is necessary to standardize defendant names, and following the example set by
Chandrasekher and Horton (2019), I did so by examining every observation individually.
The publicly available AAA data contains most of the variables of interest in this study. Each
observation pertains to a solitary claim. While the typical observation in the dataset represents one lawsuit, there are numerous instances where a solitary lawsuit is represented by
many observations. The AAA data contains not only the names of the employer-defendant
and the employee-plaintiff, but also the law firm representing the plaintiff, the arbitrator
before whom both parties appeared, the filing and resolution dates for the lawsuits, the
damages awarded (if any), the dispute subtype (an indicator of the industry of the defendant, such as retail, accounting, hospitality/travel, etc.), the state in which the arbitration
was filed, and more. Of critical interest was the disposition variable, a categorical variable taking on five values: administrative, awarded, dismissed, settled and withdrawn. This
variable is discussed in detail below.
Notably absent from this dataset are typical demographic considerations: the race, age, and
gender of the employee-plaintiff and arbitrator. Also missing was the basis of the suit: dis8

For instance, “Turner Industries” is sued severally as “Turner Industries”, “Turner Industries Group, LLC”
and “Turner Industries, Inc.”
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crimination, wrongful termination, etc. The surveys conducted in Colvin (2019), Gough
(2020) and Gough (2020) contain these hard-to-ignore details. However, while this study
suffers qualitatively in comparison, it is much richer quantitatively, with 12,056 observations rather than only several hundred. While Chandrasekher and Horton (2019) and Estlund
(2017) consider a similar size of observations, they are drawn from numerous arbitration
forums—this study focuses exclusively on AAA MAA-governed disputes, and as such has
a tighter focus.
From the D&B data cloud the sole, critical, variable added to the AAA data is total employer size. Payroll size is not considered. The rationale behind this decision is simple:
regardless of payroll size, it is the total number of employees which is likely to determine
HR considerations. A tech firm employing 20 individuals all at high salaries is less likely
to rely on an elaborate internal HR procedure than a law firm employing 200 individuals at
lower salaries.
In gathering the D&B data, I made certain assumptions in matching the AAA employerdefendant firms to the firms located in the D&B data cloud. In suits brought against a subsidiary of a parent firm, I assumed that the HR resources of the parent firm would be brought
to bear on behalf of their corporate child prior to arbitration, and therefore the employer size
of the parent company was used in my dataset. However, I made this consideration only
where there was a “brand” to defend, but not necessarily otherwise, because a holding company may care less about the legal fate of its subsidiaries when a brand name is not involved.
For instance, Pecos Valley Pizza, Inc. does business as Domino’s Pizza. For cases brought
against Pecos Valley Pizza, I assume that the HR resources of Domino’s Pizza have been
brought to bear. When a corporate child of a parent does not share a brand with the parent,
however, I assume this child is “on its own”.
Beyond this assumption, I dropped any observation for which I could not find the number
of employees in the D&B free data cloud. I also did not include observations for employerdefendants based in the Virgin Islands or headquartered overseas (except for Canada, which I
treated as “not overseas”). Lastly, I omitted 76 observations which included no information
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as to salary range. As a result of these omissions, the total number of observations was
reduced from 13,220 to 11,967.

4. Summary Statistics
Table 1 below sets forth the cross-tabulation for the salary range of the employee-plaintiffs
in this dataset and the disposition of their arbitrations.
Table 1. Salary range of employee-plaintiff and disposition of cases

Disposition
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn
Total

Up to
$100,000

$100,000 $250,000

$250,000
and Greater

Not Provided
by Parties

Total

133
358
1,733
5,063
245
7,532

19
84
55
480
42
680

6
43
24
164
7
244

184
308
296
2,561
162
3,511

342
793
2,108
8,268
456
11,967

In this study I consider disposition rather than “wins” as the prime dependent variable of
interest. Most of the various disposition outcomes speak for themselves: “awarded” means
than the employee-plaintiff won some sort of award;9 ; “dismissed” means that the case was
dismissed after arbitration was commenced; “settled” means that it was settled and “withdrawn” means that the claim was withdrawn. “Administrative” covers all other outcomes,
including notably when the party that initiated the arbitration cannot be located or when the
party that initiated the arbitration refused to accept the full relief offered by the administrator. In the context of this study, “administrative” can be considered “no result”.
As can be seen, the vast bulk of arbitration cases were settled, and roughly one-quarter
that number were dismissed. Only 6.6% of cases resulted in awards. A small handful of
arbitrations were brought by employee-plaintiffs earning $250,000 or more. The majority
were brought by employee-plaintiffs earning $100,000 or less, which does not come as a
surprise given that (1) arbitration is, on the whole, cheaper to commence and pursue than
9

Not all awards are monetary; certain awards reflect simply that the employee-plaintiff “won”. Certain
monetary awards were of a symbolic solitary dollar. Other awards were both substantive and monetary; these
awards are discussed below.
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litigation and (2) many high earners may be assumed to be more discriminating and have
more options with regard to the construction of their own employment contracts. These
individuals may well opt out of any MAA on principle, and as such few of them appear
in this dataset. As can be seen, 29.7% of the observations in this dataset contain no salary
information. This omission sets off more alarm bells than are warranted—looking at the
marginal impact of the tiers of employer size on arbitration outcomes (as will be discussed
below) yields highly similar results whether or not this impact is assessed strictly for those
cases where the employee-plaintiff was earning $100,000 or less or for the entire dataset.
This assessment includes those observations for high earners and those for which salary is
unobservable.
In considering the universe of this dataset, it is instructive to consider Table 2. In assessing
the data collected from the D&B data cloud, I made the determination to break the employment number into five distinct tiers which echo those used in Colvin (2019). In part I made
this determination because performing various regressions on the number of employees as
a continuous variable yielded results that were too minuscule to be meaningful; by contrast,
breaking this variable down into tiers makes the results statistically significant and easy to
interpret. My main rationale for choosing the specific tiers that I did was to make an applesto-apples comparison with Colvin (2019), which is a study of major significance for MAAs
and employment arbitration and which my study consistently uses as a reference point.10
The largest number of observations consist of employee-plaintiffs earning $100,000 or less
and employed by11 “Tier 5” (5,000 or more employees) companies. The second largest
grouping consists of employee-plaintiffs earning $100,000 or less and employed by “Tier
1” (99 employees or less) companies. 60% of observations pertain to Tier 5 companies,
and 15.7% pertain to Tier 1 companies—the middle tiers of company size are, to a certain

10

LOESS (locally estimated scatterplot smoothing) analysis of the continuous number of employees variable
yields some interesting insights which might suggest that there are really only two tiers that “matter” - employers
who employ 59,999 or fewer employees, and employers who employ 60,000 or more. However, making a
straight-ahead comparison with Colvin (2019) is likely to prove more valuable to the literature on this subject.
I discuss the implications of the LOESS findings in Part 7 of this paper, below.
11
Or formerly employed by, in the case of arbitrations involving termination.

4 Summary Statistics

11

extent, an afterthought in this world of 2010-2020 AAA employment arbitrations.12
Table 2. Salary range of employee-plaintiff and company tiers of employees

Number of employees

Up to
$100,000

$100,000 $250,000

$250,000
and Greater

Not Provided
by Parties

Total

909
440
551
797
4,835
7,532

134
82
30
95
339
680

39
31
13
33
128
244

793
230
229
374
1,885
3,511

1,875
783
823
1,299
7,187
11,967

Fewer than 100 employees
100 to 499 employees
500 to 999 employees
1,000 to 4,999 employees
5,000 or more employees
Total

The independent variable “dispute subtype”, which describes the industry of the workplace
for the case at hand, includes 27 discrete values, which at times makes the multinomial
logisitic regressions undertaken in this study difficult, simply because there not enough observations for each industry type to obtain meaningful results. “Dispute subtype” might
reasonably be simplified to include only three values: Retail, Restaurant/Food Service, and
Other. Retail, Restaurant/Food Service make up 43% of the observations in the data set,
while the remaining 25 discrete values for dispute subtype are quite diffuse.13
Table 3. Disposition of cases and dispute subtype by industry

Disposition
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn
Total

Restaurant /
Food Service
33
72
60
1,449
50
1,664

Retail

Other

Total

32
111
1276
2,019
52
3,490

277
610
772
4,800
354
6,813

342
793
2,108
8,268
456
11,967

The last summary of the dataset that needs to be considered involves the region in which
12

It would be interesting to study which arbitration forums the various tiers of employers are drawn to. Might
the AAA be an especially appealling forum for the largest employers due to its reputation, and to the smallest
as well, seeking the biggest name they could find? Might mid-sized employers be more inclined to try their
chances in a separate forum? These questions are beyond the scope of this paper but are worth examining.
13
Of course, in a larger dataset, we would not want to cut such corners. A case can be made here that the
third and fourth largest number of observations for dispute subtype – Healthcare, with 806 observations, and
Financial Services, with 798 – should not be lumped into “Other” along with Hospitality, Sports, Education,
etc. However, even considering the un-simplified “dispute subtype” does not radically change the conclusions
of any of the regressions reported in this study. All regressions were run with both, and the simplified and unsimplified conclusions were so similar as to make reporting the un-simplified, marginally less comprehensible
un-simplified results beside the point.
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the arbitration took place. The AAA data provides the individual states14 in which the arbitration was initiated. Running regressions with such a granular variable yielded difficult-tointerpret results, so I consolidated these observations into four distinct regions which mirror
the U.S. Census Bureau’s regional divisions—Northeast, Midwest, West and South15 . Note
in Table 4 the disproportionately large number of dismissed cases in the West. This is likely
due to the influence of California, well known to be a employee-friendly state in terms of
litigation, if not necessarily arbitration (Colvin and Gough (2015)). It is beyond the scope
of this study to posit why so many dismissals occur in the West—perhaps the “employeefriendly” culture of California leads to a pre-arbitration settlement of claims in the same way
that Tier 5 employers with strong HR procedures might, or perhaps some other explanation
is at hand. In any event it is important to take note of this quirk.
Table 4. Disposition of cases and regions where the arbitrations were initiated

Disposition
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn
Total

Northeast
42
152
80
1,990
73
2,337

Midwest
17
148
119
1,935
75
2,294

West
205
208
1625
2,016
133
4,187

South
78
285
284
2,327
175
3,149

Total
342
793
2,108
8,268
456
11,967

5. Methods
The primary outcome variable of interest for this study is disposition—whether a case resulted in an “administrative” end, an award, dismissal, settlement, or withdrawal. A secondary outcome variable of interest is award amount, although, as discussed below, it is
difficult to determine what effect if any our independent variables exert on award amount
given the limitations of the dataset.
I model the outcome disposition as a multinomial logistic function of employer tier, salary
range, dispute subtype, region, and the two repeat player effects (whether or not the employerdefendant has been seen before the same arbitrator, and whether or not the employee-plaintiff’s
14
15

Including, in 13 dropped instances, the Virgin Islands, and, surprisingly, not a single observation for Alaska.
https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf
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counsel has argued before the same arbitrator), which, with variations, takes the basic form:

e βc X i
Pr[Disposition = c] = ∑K
βc
i=1 e Xi
The vector X is composed of the variables mentioned immediately above (employer tier,
salary range, dispute subtype, region, and the two repeat player effects). The outcome variable, case disposition, takes the five discrete values detailed above: administrative, award,
dismissal, settlement or withdrawal.
Employer tier is a discrete variable with five values16 . Salary range is also a discrete variable
with four values, which refers to the annual income of the employee-plaintiffs at question,
as given by the AAA data: $0-$100,000 annually, $100,000-$250,000, $250,000 or greater,
or salary data not provided by the parties to the arbitration. Dispute subtype is a discrete
variable with three values: Retail, Restaurant/Food Service, and Other. Region is a discrete
variable which refers to the U.S. Census Bureau’s regional divisions discussed above, having
four values: Northeast, Midwest, West and South.
Concerning the repeat player effects, it is important to clarify their treatment in this study,
as opposed to in prior studies. All the studies cited above define a repeat player as either an
employer-defendant or a plaintiff’s counsel/firm that appears in an arbitration forum more
than once. Estreicher, Heise, and Sherwyn (2017) raises a well-considered objection to this
methodology:

First, repeat players are labeled repeat players simply because their second case
is in the data set, but researchers include the first case in measuring the repeat
players’ win/loss record. This placement begs a critical question: how did the
arbitrator in the first case know the employer would be a repeat player and
thus arguably have been influenced by the prospect of repeat business with that
company.

16
Fewer than 100 employees, 100 to 499 employees, 500 to 599 employees, 1,000 to 4,999 employees, and
5,000 or more employees. Throughout, this first value – Fewer than 100 employees – is the reference category
for this variable, and is such is excluded from the tables included in this study. The marginal effects reported
are always in reference to this “Tier 1” fewer than 100 employees reference category.
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In keeping with this consideration, I have defined my repeat player effects fairly narrowly.
First of all, I do not assume, especially given the AAA’s adherence to the DPP, that simply
appearing in the same forum will confer benefits upon either employer-defendants or plaintiff’s counsel.17 Rather, I assume that only appearing before the same specific individual
arbitrator repeatedly will confer such benefits, if any. Secondly, I account for Estreicher’s
objection above by subtracting 1 from the repeat player “score”. So in other words, if counsel X appears before arbitrator Y seven total times, counsel’s X repeat player score will be
six, not seven. It turns out that defining repeat players in this way significantly changes the
findings of Colvin and Gough (2015) and Chandrasekher and Horton (2019) in particular,
as will be discussed below.

6. Results
Award Amount
With regard to award amount: in the entire dataset, there are only 797 observations (out of
12,043 observations total) that contain an employee award of any sort. Of those 797 observations, the vast bulk are non-monetary. Considering awards to employee-plaintiffs of at least
$1 or more, there are only 190 observations. It is then not surprising that a regression run on
award amount controlling for employer size, region of the arbitration, employer-defendant’s
industry, and the repeat player effects for both employer-defendant and plaintiff’s counsel
yields wholly insignificant results for employer size. The regression revealed that cases
against a Tier 5 employer result in an additional $121,794 per employee-plaintiff award.
With a p-value of .621 we can read nothing into such a result of course, but one wonders
if we would see a similar result with a dataset consisting of many more monetary award
observations.18
17

As a reminder, the repeat-player effect concerns the employer-defendant entity, not employer-defendant’s
counsel. The counsel of each employer-defendant is not even noted in the dataset. By contrast, it is the specific
repeat-playing attorney or law firm – plaintiff’s counsel – that imparts a repeat-player effect on the employeeplaintiff.
18
The results of the studies cited thus far suggest that the “win” rate in arbitration is sufficiently low in general
that such a hypothetical dataset might need to be several orders larger than the one I have assembled for this
study.
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Disposition
Now let us turn to disposition. Here the impact of employer size is concrete. As mentioned,
treating employer size as a continuous variable yields statistically significant results that
are nonetheless too minuscule to be considered. However, using the tiers discussed above
produces illuminating results.
Table 5 below reports the marginal effect of the five employment tiers on disposition. The
reference category, not displayed on the table, is fewer than 100 employees (“Tier 1”). A
quick glance reveals that throughout, the impact of employment tier size is mostly not significant, except for Tier 5. Tier 5 observations do make up nearly 60% of the dataset but
it is still striking to see that the impact of employer size is generally of little impart until,
above a certain threshold, it is suddenly quite decisive.
Cases involving Tier 5 employers are 1.85% more likely than the Tier 1 reference category
(1 to 99 employees) to result in awards for the employee-plaintiff, 11.8% more likely to be
dismissed, 13.1% less likely to settle, and 1.22% more likely to be withdrawn.19 Leaving
speculation aside as to why this might be, it seems indisputable that, controlling for the
repeat player effect, the size of the employer-defendant alone is fairly determinative for the
disposition of an employment arbitration in the AAA. To control for whether the industry
classification of the employer-defendant concretely impacts these outcomes, two regressions
are reported in Table 5: one including dispute subtype as an independent variable, and one
that does not. The differences between the two are trivial.

19

A note about the use of percentages in my analysis: my results are derived from first running a multinomial
logistic regression, as discussed above, and subsequently using Stata’s margins command to find the average
marginal partial effect of employer tier on the outcome variable, case disposition. In other words, I report not
the log-odds of the multinomial logistic regression but rather the predicted probability of a given disposition
occurring as one moves from the reference category of employer tier – Tier 1, or employers employing fewer than
100 employees – to the other employer tiers. It is reasonable to discuss these probabilities in terms of percentage
likelihoods relative to the reference category, and I use that convention throughout. Log-odds are much more
difficult to interpret at first glance. For further reading, and for the rationale for my shorthand use of percentages
in discussing marginal effects, I point to https://www.stata.com/features/overview/marginal-analysis/ as well as
https://www3.nd.edu/ rwilliam/stats/Margins01.pdf. The latter analysis of margins is especially clear and rich.

16 Arbitration Outcomes and Employer Size

Table 5. Disposition Outcomes

(1)
Dispute Subtype

(2)
No Dispute Subtype

100 to 499 employees
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn

−0.0163∗∗
−0.0108
−0.0003
0.0257
0.0017

(-3.00)
(-1.47)
(-0.02)
(1.72)
(0.28)

−0.0165∗∗
−0.0110
0.0024
0.0237
0.0014

(-3.00)
(-1.48)
(0.21)
(1.59)
(0.22)

500 to 999 employees
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn

0.1280∗∗∗
0.0087
−0.0267∗
−0.1090∗∗∗
−0.0018

(8.40)
(0.78)
(-2.03)
(-5.37)
(-0.23)

0.1330∗∗∗
0.0089
−0.0338∗∗
−0.1060∗∗∗
−0.0017

(8.65)
(0.79)
(-2.91)
(-5.33)
(-0.21)

1,000 to 4,999 employees
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn

−0.0169∗∗∗
0.0196∗
−0.0014
−0.0004
−0.0009

(-3.30)
(2.48)
(-0.13)
(-0.03)
(-0.16)

−0.0169∗∗
0.0208∗∗
0.0025
−0.0056
−0.0008

(-3.25)
(2.58)
(0.24)
(-0.39)
(-0.14)

5,000 or more employees
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn

−0.0174∗∗∗
0.0185∗∗∗
0.1180∗∗∗
−0.1310∗∗∗
0.0122∗∗

(-4.10)
(3.32)
(13.95)
(-12.36)
(2.80)

−0.0183∗∗∗
0.0162∗∗
0.1360∗∗∗
−0.1430∗∗∗
0.0087∗

(-4.39)
(2.97)
(16.93)
(-13.90)
(2.01)

Observations

11,967.0000

t statistics in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

11,967.0000
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To make more sense of the repeat player effect in isolation, consider Table 6. Here the same
multinominal logistical regression described above has been conducted under three separate
conditions: (1) with a repeat employer-defendant only present; (2) with a repeat plaintiff’s
counsel only present; and (3) with both present.20
Table 6. Repeat Player Effect on Disposition Outcomes, Separately and Jointly

(1)
Repeat Defendant
Only

(2)
Repeat Plaintiff
Attorney Only

(3)
Both

100 to 499 employees
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn

−0.0859∗
−0.1180∗∗
−0.0594
0.3430∗∗∗
−0.0798∗

(-2.36)
(-2.59)
(-1.80)
(5.26)
(-2.30)

0.0114
−0.0045
0.0240
−0.0199
−0.0110

(0.61)
(-0.16)
(0.61)
(-0.37)
(-0.38)

−0.0006
−0.0155∗∗
−0.1190∗∗
0.1260∗∗∗
0.0096

(-0.09)
(-3.29)
(-3.18)
(3.32)
(1.41)

500 to 999 employees
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn

−0.0429
−0.0831
−0.0326
0.1630
−0.0043

(-0.79)
(-1.46)
(-0.77)
(1.66)
(-0.07)

−0.0228∗∗
0.0007
−0.0435
0.0767
−0.0110

(-2.60)
(0.02)
(-1.26)
(1.28)
(-0.31)

0.2450∗∗∗
−0.0151∗∗
−0.0487
−0.1810∗∗∗
−0.0001

(8.19)
(-2.71)
(-1.35)
(-5.82)
(-0.02)

1,000 to 4,999 employees
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn

−0.0495
0.0087
0.0160
0.0823
−0.0575

(-1.21)
(0.15)
(0.37)
(1.02)
(-1.52)

0.0037
0.0634
−0.0224
−0.0440
−0.0007

(0.24)
(1.91)
(-0.74)
(-0.90)
(-0.03)

0.0090
0.0049
−0.0807
0.0669
0.0000

(0.84)
(0.60)
(-1.84)
(1.54)
(-0.01)

5,000 or more employees
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn

−0.0538
−0.0328
0.0341
0.0402
0.0124

(-1.44)
(-0.69)
(0.97)
(0.59)
(0.34)

−0.0082
0.0757∗∗∗
0.0500∗
−0.1310∗∗∗
0.0140

(-0.80)
(3.46)
(2.01)
(-3.70)
(0.69)

−0.0023
0.0068
0.1060∗∗∗
−0.1300∗∗∗
0.0190∗∗∗

(-0.47)
(1.39)
(5.45)
(-6.61)
(4.43)

Observations

797.0000

1249.0000

5816.0000

t statistics in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
20

As a reminder, the two repeat player effects considered in this study are (1) the effect of an employerdefendant appearing before the same arbitrator repeatedly, referred to as the employer-defendant repeat player
effect, and (2) the effect of plaintiff’s counsel appearing before the same arbitrator repeatedly, referred to as the
employee-plaintiff repeat player effect. Appearing in the same arbitration forum repeatedly is not considered a
repeat player effect in this study.
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There are several surprises in this table. For one, for observations in which the employerdefendant repeat player effect is exclusive, the significance of employer size melts away—at
least for Tier 5. However, for Tier 2, the results are more significant than they are when one
does not impose the condition of employer-defendant repeat player effect exclusivity. When
Tier 2 (100 to 499 employees) employer-defendants appear repeatedly before an arbitrator
and plaintiff’s counsel does not, the settlement rate jumps a whopping 34.3% compared
to Tier 1 employer-defendants who do the same. Likelihood of an award drops 11.8%.
However, dismissals and withdrawals also drop (each less than 10%). While the sample
size is small – 797 observations – the implications are intriguing.
When only a repeat plaintiff’s counsel appears in an observation, we see a significant increase in the number of cases resulting in awards for cases involving Tier 5 employees
(7.57% as opposed to 1.85% in Table 5). There is a decrease in the number of dismissals
(5% as opposed to 11.8%), and roughly 11.3% fewer cases are settled. Considering the rationale experienced counsel might bring to bear in such employment cases, this result is not
surprising, about which more will be said below.
When both repeat player effects are at play, we see a striking increase – 10.6% – in the
likelihood of dismissal, as well as a 13% decline in the likelihood of settlement.21
Given the centrality of repeat player effects in the literature concerning employment arbitration, and how differently (following the lead of the critique in Estreicher, Heise, and Sherwyn (2017)) I have defined them in this study, it is worth turning away from the marginal
impact of employer size for a moment to consider the marginal impact of the repeat player
effects themselves. The below two tables show the marginal effect of one repeat player flag
or the other (not both at once) on Tier 1 and Tier 5 employers.22
What immediately sticks out about these results is that they appear to directly contradict
Chandrasekher and Horton (2019) with regard to repeat player plaintiff’s counsel. When
the repeat player effect for plaintiff’s counsel is present for both the smallest and largest em21
22

The comparison made here are to the results in Table 5, where repeat player flags are not specified.
I here deliberately avoid Tiers 2 through 4 because of their smaller sample size—see Table 2.
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Table 7. Repeat Player Effect on Disposition Outcomes, Smallest Employers (Tier 1), Flag

(1)
Repeat Defendant
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn
Observations

0.0335∗∗∗
−0.0518∗∗∗
0.0021
0.0190
−0.0027

(4.60)
(-8.09)
(0.35)
(1.78)
(-0.65)

11,967.0000

(2)
Repeat Plaintiff Attorney
−0.0018
−0.0174∗∗∗
0.0737∗∗∗
−0.0542∗∗∗
−0.0004

(-0.30)
(-3.44)
(10.75)
(-5.43)
(-0.09)

11,967.0000

t statistics in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

ployers, the marginal impact on awards is negative and the number of dismissals is larger.
Both effects are statistically significant at the 1% level. These results directly contradict
the premise that a plaintiff’s counsel who repeatedly appears before the same arbitrator provides benefits to the employee-plaintiff. It may be that familiarity with the “system” of
a given arbitration forum (here, the AAA) provides a benefit—this study does not control for such. However, appearing repeatedly before a given arbitrator does not appear to
give the employee-plaintiff an edge. The findings for the repeat player effect for employerdefendants are much less surprising. Awards are down, between 5-7%, at both employer
size levels, significant at the 1% level. Dismissals are up, and settlements are also slightly
up—all of which comports with what we’ve come to expect so far.
Table 8. Repeat Player Effect on Disposition Outcomes, Largest Employers (Tier 5), Flag

(1)
Repeat Defendant
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn
Observations

0.0137∗∗∗
−0.0660∗∗∗
0.0122
0.0414∗∗∗
−0.0013
11,967.0000

(5.18)
(-8.79)
(1.32)
(3.60)
(-0.26)

(2)
Repeat Plaintiff Attorney
−0.0024
−0.0280∗∗∗
0.1220∗∗∗
−0.0875∗∗∗
−0.0038

(-1.04)
(-4.33)
(13.20)
(-7.94)
(-0.76)

11,967.0000

t statistics in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Considering the repeat player effects as continuous variables, not dummy variables, we see
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Table 9. Repeat Player Effect on Disposition Outcomes, Smallest Employers (Tier 1),
Continuous

(1)
Repeat Defendant
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn
Observations

0.0003∗∗∗
−0.0054∗∗∗
0.0004∗∗∗
0.0044∗∗∗
0.0002∗∗∗

(5.52)
(-6.40)
(7.24)
(6.20)
(4.39)

11,967.0000

(2)
Repeat Plaintiff Attorney
−0.0001∗∗∗
−0.0002∗∗∗
−0.0001∗∗∗
0.0006∗∗∗
−0.0002∗∗∗

(-4.22)
(-3.76)
(-3.86)
(9.89)
(-5.07)

11,967.0000

t statistics in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

that the marginal impact of each successive appearance by either the defendant-employer
or the plaintiff-employee’s counsel is highly significant and yet extremely small for all outcomes, for both the smallest tier of employers and the largest.23
Table 10. Repeat Player Effect on Disposition Outcomes, Largest Employers (Tier 5),
Continuous

(1)
Repeat Defendant
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn
Observations

0.0002∗∗∗
−0.0070∗∗∗
0.0014∗∗∗
0.0050∗∗∗
0.0005∗∗∗
11,967.0000

(5.73)
(-6.85)
(7.83)
(6.59)
(5.36)

(2)
Repeat Plaintiff Attorney
−0.0001∗∗∗
−0.0002∗∗∗
−0.0001∗
0.0007∗∗∗
−0.0003∗∗∗

(-3.93)
(-3.52)
(-2.56)
(10.10)
(-5.27)

11,967.0000

t statistics in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Given that this dataset focuses exclusively on MAA-governed employment arbitrations, it is
worth contemplating the impact that the Epic Systems ruling might or might not have had on
disposition outcomes. Sadly, the number of post-Epic Systems observations in this dataset
is too limited to draw any strong conclusions. Extrapolating from what we can observe (see
23

All the regressions reported in this study were run twice, first utilizing the repeat player effect flags as
independent variables, and then utilizing the continuous repeat player variables as independent variables. The
differences between each were miniscule at best, and therefore throughout this paper I report results of the
regressions utilizing the continuous repeat player effects. Anyone interested in seeing the differences between
these regressions may contact the author.
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Table 11), it seems possible that the post-Epic Systems world might feature more settlements
for the largest employers. For now we can only wait for future years to see if this speculation
bears fruit.
Class-Action Style Cases
It is worth commenting on the effect of “class-action style” cases, in which a plaintiff’s
attorney commences a multitude of individual arbitrations against the same defendant on
the same date, thereby attempting to emulate proper class action litigation. There are very
few of these attempts found in my dataset, as the below graph makes clear.

Taking an extremely sweeping definition of these attempts – that more than 50 cases brought
by the same attorney against the same employer-defendant constitutes a “class-action style”
attempt – and dropping these observations from the dataset only somewhat alters the conclusions stated above. The total number of observations drops from 12,043 to 9,205. Most
of these observations come from employee-plaintiffs in the $0-$100,000 salary range employed/formerly employed by Tier 5 employer-defendants. Only the impact on Tier 5 employers is substantial and significant. Omitting “class-action” arbitrations makes dismissal
roughly 6.5% less likely and makes settlement 6% more likely. These findings do not ma-
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terially change no matter how we control for different combinations of the repeat player
effects.

7. Analysis and Avenues for Future Study
The clear takeaway of this study is that employer size has very little impact on employment
arbitration outcomes until employer size hits the threshold of 5,000 employees or more,
roughly speaking. It is striking how little statistical significance we can derive in outcomes
as employer size creeps steadily upwards from 1 to 4,999 total employees per company.
Employee size as a continuous variable was not reported in this study but the marginal impact of a given additional employee proves too minuscule to comment on. Nonetheless once
we hit the 5,000 plus threshold established in Colvin (2019) we do begin to see significant
impacts on employment arbitrations. We see many more dismissals, fewer settlements, and
a slightly higher amount of awards.
This study does not establish the “why” of these findings. The survey approach employed in
Colvin (2019) and Gough (2020) begins to get at the rationale for these findings, but yields
a limited number of observations with all the obvious flaws of self-reporting. This study,
while cruder, is of value because insofar as it establishes a pattern of outcomes based on
employer size.
One would hope to obtain documentation of HR procedures for a wide array of companies
defending themselves in employment arbitration to reach conclusions about the quality of
the claims that reach arbitration in the first place. As strongly suggested by Estreicher,
Heise, and Sherwyn (2017), it may well be that only the most intractable claims reach the
arbitration stage—or, as Estlund (2017) suggests, that there is a chilling effect imposed by
MAAs that deters valid claims from advancing to the stage of arbitration to begin with.
Without being able to peer within the internal HR procedures of any given company it is
virtually impossible to determine why, exactly, the character of arbitration outcomes is so
notably different for the nation’s largest companies as opposed to their smaller cousins. In
particular, we would like to compare the internal HR processes of smaller employers with
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larger employers, to see how similar or dissimilar they may be. Absent such documentation –
which may be notably difficult to obtain without what is in legal terms known as “discovery”,
i.e., a mandatory turning-over of documentation – it will remain a mystery why employer
size functions as it does in the context of arbitration.
It is also worth pausing to note that this study examines exclusively lawsuits held in the
“reputable” AAA, governed by it is as by the DPP and arguably the closest alternative to
litigation that we can examine. Estlund (2017) strongly suggests that the employee-plaintiff
faces a harder slog in less reputable arbitration forums than the AAA and that their disposition outcomes suffer accordingly.
Nonetheless within the allegedly reputable world of the AAA we can see that after crossing a certain line employer size-wise, the employee-plaintiff faces a steeper uphill battle to
achieve a positive disposition. That the individual employee-plaintiff, unlikely or unable to
join in a class with his or her peers, would face a steep challenge against a sizable employerdefendant is not surprising, even leaving repeat player effects out of the equation. What is
surprising, however, is that the employee-plaintiff going up against a employer-defendant
in AAA arbitration seems to face equal odds if that defendant employs, for instance, 3,000
individuals as opposed to 300. This study suggests that the potential employee-plaintiff
should not be any more deterred by facing a company with 2,000 employees than one with
20, at least as far as cases heard in the AAA are concerned.
An obvious shortcoming of this study is that it looks narrowly at AAA arbitrations over
the course of one pivotal decade.24 Were this study to incorporate JAMS arbitrations over
the same time period we might well come to separate conclusions. Another shortcoming
of this data is the lack of information on payroll numbers. While I have assumed that it is
employee size rather than payroll size that dictates the HR processes of a given company,
this assumption may not hold, and future studies should incorporate this data.
The alternate approach taken in this study with regard to defining the repeat player effect,
24

Pivotal in the sense that, in this decade, employment arbitration became a more widely accepted substitute
to employment litigation.
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Table 11. Disposition Outcomes, pre- and post-Epic, Repeat Player Flags

(1)
Pre-Epic

(2)
Post-Epic

100 to 499 employees
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn

−0.0164∗∗
−0.0132
0.0137
0.0116
0.0044

(-2.92)
(-1.43)
(1.02)
(0.67)
(0.58)

−0.0208
−0.0027
−0.0089
0.0418∗
−0.0094

(-1.56)
(-0.37)
(-1.12)
(2.15)
(-0.85)

500 to 999 employees
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn

−0.0087
0.0051
−0.0625∗∗∗
0.0677∗∗
−0.0016

(-1.05)
(0.38)
(-4.77)
(3.27)
(-0.17)

0.2350∗∗∗
0.0149
−0.0074
−0.2460∗∗∗
0.0042

(6.54)
(0.84)
(-0.61)
(-6.66)
(0.21)

1,000 to 4,999 employees
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn

−0.0143∗∗
0.0206∗
−0.0428∗∗∗
0.0458∗∗
−0.0093

(-2.60)
(2.14)
(-4.16)
(3.05)
(-1.57)

−0.0279∗
0.0066
0.0093
−0.0141
0.0261

(-2.23)
(0.74)
(0.81)
(-0.62)
(1.69)

5,000 or more employees
Administrative
Awarded
Dismissed
Settled
Withdrawn

−0.0171∗∗∗
0.0213∗∗
0.0697∗∗∗
−0.0820∗∗∗
0.0080

(-3.87)
(3.07)
(7.64)
(-6.85)
(1.61)

−0.0127
0.0043
0.0153
−0.0338∗
0.0269∗∗

(-1.19)
(0.74)
(1.96)
(-2.10)
(2.76)

Observations

9461.0000

t statistics in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

2506.0000

7 Analysis and Avenues for Future Study

25

as suggested by Estreicher, Heise, and Sherwyn (2017), yields surprising results that should
be taken seriously even if the rest of the study is found be flawed or too narrowly focused
on the AAA. The eminently reasonable objection that a first appearance before an arbitrator
by either party cannot be considered part of a “repeat” effect has not been incorporated by
other studies to date. The results of this study differ in notable ways from the rich results
of Chandrasekher and Horton (2019). Chandrasekher and Horton (2019) finds statistically
significant results for the repeat player effect of employer-defendants in the same forum; by
contrast, this study finds significant impacts only for Tier 2 (100 to 499 employees) employers who are repeat players, and no other significant effects (see Table 6). Meanwhile, while
the repeat player effect for plaintiff’s counsel is highly significant insofar as the largest employers are concerned, the practical effects cut two ways for employee-plaintiff claimants:
repeat playing plaintiff’s counsel yields 7.57% uptick in awards yet also a 5% uptick in
dismissals. The settlement rate is down 13.1% in such scenarios. Perhaps repeat playing
plaintiff’s counsel are simply determined high stakes gamblers? This would make a certain degree of sense if we accept the rationale advanced by Estreicher, Heise, and Sherwyn
(2017) that the most meritorious cases don’t make it to arbitration in the first place, having
long prior been settled by internal HR procedures.
An important consideration absent from this study (and from most of the studies contemplated thus far) is the mentality of the attorney who either takes or declines an employment
case before arbitration. Estreicher, Heise, and Sherwyn (2017) comments on the thought
process of lawyers with regard to case selection thus:

[P]laintiffs’ lawyers are rational actors and typically do not take cases unless
they see a significant potential return to warrant their time and effort. They will
take cases for settlement purposes that may be relatively weak on the merits
but exhibit other characteristics that suggest a prompt resolution. But unless
lawyers are directly compensated by the client or third party for their time, the
cases they are willing to expend significant time and effort on are likely to be
relatively strong on the merits and suggest recovery of substantial damages.
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It is possible that the deterrent effect of facing a large employer-defendant in arbitration,
along with the minimal legal fees that most employee-plaintiffs are able to pay,25 put the
most capable counsel off of representing employee-plaintiffs in arbitration at all (potentially
exacerbating the cycle of outcomes). Clearly, certain repeat-playing plaintiff’s counsel have
other considerations in mind. A systematic examination of the decision-making of plaintiff’s
counsel in the arbitration context, beyond Gough (2020), would be of tremendous value.
This study is focused exclusively on the impact of employer size in a sample from one decade
within one arbitration forum. The arbitration forum in question may be fairly reputable and
committed to public reporting, but it is nonetheless worth bearing in mind that arbitrations
are wholly private, unlike litigations, which can be observed by the public. While the AAA
has made much information public, much more remains missing—notably case-by-case demographic information. Gender, age, race and all other demographic considerations do not
appear in this study. That is because this information is not given in the AAA publiclyavailable database that was used, and this is an obvious major flaw of the data which undermines this study. We are left to imagine a world in which demographics do not impact of
these arbitrations, which seems ludicrous.26 For instance, do the Tier 5 employers considered here happen to employ a disproportionate number of non-native English speakers? Do
women disproportionately appear as plaintiffs in employment arbitration cases against Tier
5 employers?
Despite this flaw, we can be very grateful for the information on the previous salaries of
the employee-plaintiff claimants that the AAA provides. Given the tiers we are provided
for this variable ($100,000 or less annually; $100,000-$250,000 annually; or $250,000 or
greater annually) we can speculate with some degree of confidence as to the demographics
of the groups involved.27 One of the most significant takeaways from this study is that
the disposition outcomes for individuals within a wide range of salaries are not radically
25

See also Estreicher, Heise, and Sherwyn (2017)
Even if Gough and Colvin (2020) suggests this may in fact be the case.
27
It would be best, of course, in the absence of demographic information, if the AAA could make publicly
available an even more granular breakdown of salary range. There is surely a substantive difference in the
ability of the individual earning $90,000 per year to retain counsel as opposed to their peer earning less than
$40,000.
26
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different. The entirety of the observations contained in this dataset involve MAAs. It is
unlikely that top-flight attorneys would submit themselves to an MAA. But that a notable
number of individuals earning at least $250,000 appear to do so suggests that the practice
is widespread, and all the literature on this subject suggests it is more likely to spread than
abate.
Another potential shortcoming of this study is that the “dispute subtype” variable, which
concerns the specific industry of the employer-defendant, is too granular to be of much use.
Perhaps over a much larger dataset we would see significant results. Combining the various
subtypes into larger categories yields more concrete and significant results, but this approach
begs the question of whether we are potentially overlooking industry-specific effects. In this
study, dispute subtype was somewhat surprisingly almost a complete non-factor in determining outcomes, either in its simplified or un-simplified form.
The employment tiers chosen here, while based on Colvin (2019), are arbitrary. LOESS
analysis of the number of employees – a continuous variable, not broken into tiers – suggests
that above the mean value of this variable (58,118 employees) there is a notable uptick in
the probability of dismissals and a notable decrease in the probability of settlements. Above
80,000 employees, more or less, the probability of an award increases. Perhaps a company
employing 5,000 employees doesn’t deserve a “top tier” classification—perhaps 60,000 or
more employees is the true “heavyweight” category. And perhaps 5 tiers is too many; maybe
there are simply “behemoths” and “everyone else”. Experimentation regarding employer
tier size is a valid avenue for future research.
What we can say concretely for now is that in the past decade, concerning employment arbitrations arising from disputes governed by a mandatory arbitration agreement conducted
in the forum of the American Arbitration Association, employer size was a significant factor only for the largest employers. Repeat player effects were of little impact for smaller
employers or the plaintiff’s counsel opposing them. If one defines the repeat player effect
as an interaction among individuals (the defendant, the arbitrator, and plaintiff’s counsel)
its impact is fairly debatable. It seems, however, that the sheer heft of the largest employers
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does come to bear notably on the outcome of employment arbitrations. The reason why that
may be is left to future studies.

References
Chandrasekher, Andrea Cann and David Horton. 2019. “Arbitration Nation: Data from Four
Providers.” Calif. L. Rev. 107:1.
Colvin, Alexander JS. 2014. “Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment.” Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law 35 (1/2):71–90.
———. 2019. “The Metastisization of Mandatory Arbitration.” Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 94:3.
Colvin, Alexander JS and Mark D Gough. 2015. “Individual employment rights arbitration
in the United States: Actors and outcomes.” ILR Review 68 (5):1019–1042. URL http:
//www.jstor.org/stable/24810326.
Estlund, Cynthia. 2017. “The black hole of mandatory arbitration.” NCL Rev. 96:679.
Estreicher, Samuel, Michael Heise, and David S Sherwyn. 2017. “Evaluating employment
arbitration: a call for better empirical research.” Rutgers UL Rev. 70:375.
Gough, Mark. 2020. “A Tale of Two Forums: Employment Discrimination Outcomes in
Arbitration and Litigation.” ILR Review :0019793920915876.
Gough, Mark D and Alexander JS Colvin. 2020. “Decision-Maker and Context Effects in
Employment Arbitration.” ILR Review 73 (2):479–497.
LeRoy, Michael H and Peter Feuille. 2002. “Judicial Enforcement of Predispute Arbitration
Agreements: Back to the Future.” Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 18:249.

